Book Review of Inside the Enemy’s Computer: Identifying Cyber-Attackers by Clement Guitton by Peters, Mark T.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) Homeland Security Affairs (Journal)
2020-04
Book Review of Inside the Enemys Computer:
Identifying Cyber-Attackers by Clement Guitton
Peters, Mark T.
Monterey, California.  Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security
Peters, Mark T. Review of Inside the Enemys Computer: Identifying Cyber-Attackers,
Clement Guitton. Homeland Security Affairs 16, Article 2. www.hsaj.org/articles/15817
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/65093
The copyright of all articles published in Homeland Security Affairs rests with the
author[s] of the articles. Any commercial use of Homeland Security Affairs or the
articles published herein is expressly prohibited without the written consent of the
copyright holder. Anyone can copy, distribute, or reuse these articles as long as the
author and original source are properly cited.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Book Review:  
Inside the Enemy’s Computer: 
Identifying Cyber-Attackers 
by Clement Guitton
Reviewed by Mark T. Peters II, USAF, Retired
2 Book Review: Inside the Enemy’s Computer: 
Identifying Cyber-Attackers by Clement Guitton 
Reviewed by Mark T. Peters II, USAF, Retired
Homeland Security Affairs | Volume 16 – Article 2  (April 2020) | WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Suggested Citation
Peters, Mark T.  Review of Inside the Enemy’s Computer: Identifying Cyber-Attackers,  
by Clement Guitton. Homeland Security Affairs 16, Article 2. 
www.hsaj.org/articles/15817
Expanding cyber-domain conflicts challenge modern strategists to create definitive attribution 
standards for who did what to whom, especially in developing national policy. Attribution’s 
importance was illustrated  during Russia’s 2017 notPetya ransomware  attack against the 
Ukraine, where  Mondelez International’s European retail services  suffered over $100M in 
collateral information technology damages. Subsequently, Mondelez filed an insurance claim 
with their policy holder, Zurich International. However, U.S. and NATO public declarations 
attributed the NotPetya attack to the Russian state rather than the proxy group who launched 
the attack. Allowing Zurich to declare state sponsorship created a non-payable policy exclusion, 
leaving the issue yet to be legally settled.1 Attribution’s rising importance across the global cyber 
commons makes Clement Guitton’s comprehensive analysis in Inside the Enemy’s Computer: 
Identifying Cyber-Attackers vital to all readers and expertise areas. Beginning with an analysis 
of attribution constraints, the book moves rapidly to explore processes rather than individual, 
event-based problems. Guitton’s attribution framework emphasizes differing criminal and 
national security approaches such as detailing, expert judgement, evidentiary standards, 
corporate privatization, timeliness, and plausible deniability.
The statement, “Attribution begets action “ (186) proves core to Guitton’s procedural 
exploration.  If attribution is central to uncovering cyberattack origins, then overall attribution 
efforts drive intended results including criminal convictions, state sanctions, or retaliatory 
actions. Effective attribution theories favor legal and political investigations as quoted below:  
The central argument of this book, and a short answer to the two research 
questions it investigates, is therefore that the attribution of cyber attacks is a 
two-pronged political process. The processes are never entirely ‘solved’, but 
evolve through different stages depending on the nature of the incident. In many 
such incidents, the process closely follows a legal path; in others, the incident 
and its attribution remain within the realm of the executive. However, in both 
processes the attribution of cyber attacks is not unique, and shares a wealth of 
common properties with the attribution of either criminal or national security 
incidents.(11)
The book addresses common attribution misconceptions regarding technical complexity, hidden 
origins, and unique appearance while suggesting clear goals to generate effective responses 
following initial adversary actions. Each framework item fills a chapter and progressively builds 
through well-documented examples.
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Guitton’s first step examines assessing cyberattacks with expert judgement. Attribution’s 
political imperatives first emerge from analytical aids such as known suspect lists and foreign IP 
address origins while using core concepts to frame practices with a predilection towards repeat 
offenders versus uncovering new actors. States select likely offenders from the previously guilty 
and blame them rather than conduct costly investigations.  Tracking attacks to foreign-based 
IPs often remains sufficient to satisfy political attribution. Logical fallacies often occur but leave 
three main reasons supporting attribution: convincing the public, supporting retaliatory efforts, 
or building patterns for future events. The use of expert judgement leads directly to employed 
discovery standards.
Guitton then turns to the analysis of discovery standards. Discovery standards illustrate criminal 
and national security requirements for distinct attribution. In the absence of such standards, 
each case appears isolated rather than linked to processes. The highlighted criminal case 
features Data Stream Cowboy’s USAF server attack while the highlighted national security case 
explores Operation Ababil’s Stuxnet retaliation on U.S. banking. The U.S. judiciary uses binary 
guilt and “beyond a reasonable doubt” standards while national security attribution evinces 
a more nuanced perspective. A six-item national security attribution list appears with items 
including attack scale, associated technical or geopolitical data, and attack beneficiary. The 
checklist demonstrates a process to convince national audiences to support retaliatory action 
without waiting for criminal proof.
 
Next, the author questions which players possess the technical and political knowledge to identify 
attacks accurately. Private companies conducting attribution analysis face multiple credibility 
challenges from factors like past associations, technical expertise, and result quality. This chapter’s 
cases are Mandiant’s Chinese Advanced Persistent Threat-1 (APT1) work and Kaspersky Lab’s initial 
Stuxnet reports. Private firms conducting attribution analysis face three political questions: how 
many former intelligence officials they employ; who benefits from release timing; and why some 
refuse to name suspected offenders. The author explores how private corporate ownership shifts 
responsibility from national actors through government contracts.
Timeliness follows knowledge to generate process speed through delivery differences between 
criminal and national practices. Criminal cases tend towards quick actions, justifying arrest with 
mere suspicion, and gathering most evidence after arrests. Analysis of the case studies suggests 
that national attribution favors gathering information during cyberattack events and waiting 
to formulate retaliatory actions before publicizing theories. These models support the theory 
of all attribution being political at its core. Public attribution debates sometimes favor instant 
results. However, this work clearly suggests that context matters more than immediate answers.  
Citing the discovery of ten new malware items daily with minimal attribution as cybersecurity 
elements focus on fixes rather than causes, market reports still find that cybersecurity protects 
the average corporation from $11M in losses yearly even without attribution.2
Closing with a contrary approach, Guitton describes how attribution efforts can be countered 
with plausible deniability. States deferring expert judgement to private companies mitigate 
incorrect attribution risks just as hacker group proxies reduce state culpability. The book 
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evaluates cases involving Iranian, Russian, and Syrian proxy groups with techniques including 
denying sponsorship, staying below attributable thresholds, and technical masking practices.  
Most deniable practices appear to follow the informal CIA covert operations motto, “admit 
nothing, deny everything, and counter-accuse” rather than implement complex, technical, and 
potentially costly, solutions.3   
 
An excellent attribution analysis, Inside the Enemy’s Computer explores a well-defined thesis 
and key cases. The book is admittedly focused primarily on U.S.-based events and Guitton 
emphasizes attribution’s political nature over technical solutions. Overall, the author adequately 
sums up his theoretical shortfalls. However, the book could be improved by expanding 
attribution’s historical context, providing comparative charts, and adding a single, baseline 
case study.  The discussion of historical context was limited to the introduction and lacked any 
comparison for past practices to the new model.  Consolidated tables as comparative charts for 
criminal and national security models would have been helpful also. Finally, detailing one cyber-
attack case and following it throughout the work may have increased multidimensional viability.
Overall, Inside the Enemy’s Computer offers an exceptional strategic attribution analysis 
and well-developed alternative model. This work should be of interest to anyone who deals 
regularly with cyber challenges to homeland security. It is highly enjoyable and a quick read, 
even for those not intimately familiar with cyberspace operational practices. The biggest take 
away for government policy expert, or intelligence analyst remains Guitton’s central comment: 
“Attribution begets action” (187). Cybersecurity’s dynamic nature means technical factors 
change on a weekly, daily, and hourly basis making excellent attribution processes critical.  
Guitton describes the necessity to discount purely technical limitations and explore strategic 
options. Successful analytic models will create standards and study areas without technical 
restraints. I recommend this text to everyone, but especially those working with cybersecurity, 
intelligence analysis, or policy issues surrounding the global cyber commons.
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